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1. INTRODUCTION 
Electro-explosive devices (EEDs) are commonly used in 
many industries (e.g. mining, automotive, and military) because 
of their versatility and simple operation mode. These devices 
are typically activated by means of a D.C. current applied on 
their feed wires. However, an unintended activation can be 
achieved with an external electromagnetic (EM) field coupled 
to their connection wires. The electromagnetic susceptibility 
of EEDs has been studied using different strategies in which 
the feed wires were commonly considered as the element to 
which the EM field couples, and the EED as its load1-7. To 
determine the characteristics of the electromagnetic field that 
causes the EED’s activation, this problem has been simplified 
representing the wires as standard antennas with known 
characteristics (e.g. dipoles and loops)1-4, applying analyses of 
worst case based on these canonical structures1,4-7, and assuming 
that the system is electrically short8. Furthermore, most of the 
studies have modeled the EED as a pure resistive element with 
a constant, low resistance. However, EEDs have been shown 
to be characterized by a frequency-dependent impedance with 
resonant behavior9. Thus, this frequency dependence and, as 
a consequence, the variable impedance matching between the 
connection wires and the EED become an important factor to 
be taken into account in this susceptibility problem10.
The activation of EEDs due to EM field exposure depends 
on the intensity and the spectral content of the incident 
field. Narrow band systems, used to produce Intentional 
Electromagnetic Interferences (IEMI), can be efficiently used 
in EED neutralization by taking advantage of the resonant 
behavior of the EEDs11. If the transfer function between the 
incident field and the dissipated power in the EED is known, 
optimal coupling frequencies could be derived. Mora12, et al. 
proposed a methodology to calculate the transfer function 
including the transient energy conversion into heat inside an 
EED. It can be applied if the complete system characteristics are 
known. However, actual circuits with EEDs present connection 
wires with arbitrary geometries and, as a consequence, arbitrary 
frequency responses. This randomness in the system calls for a 
statistical analysis of the problem. 
Monte-Carlo approach has been a useful tool to 
characterize electromagnetic interactions with wires. The 
response of twisted-wire pairs exited by a plane wave was 
studied by Armenta13 et al., where the effect of small random 
variations of the twisting was analyzed through this method in a 
wide frequency range. Faster techniques that take advantage of 
the statistical characteristics of the problem, but with the same 
principle, have also been proposed. For example, the statistical 
indicators (i.e. mean, standard deviation and kurtosis) of the 
induced voltage in an undulating thin-wire over a ground plane 
have been obtained with a similar method denominated sparse 
grid14.  
In this paper, the probability of activation of an EED with 
connection wires with arbitrary geometry and excited by a 
linearly polarized electromagnetic field is presented. First, the 
electromagnetic (EM) coupling of a plane wave on an EED 
with wires is analyzed deterministically. In the third section, 
a steady state thermal model, based on ANSYS® simulations, 
to find the activation dissipated power is depicted. In the 
fourth section, a statistical analysis of the induced power in 
an EED illuminated with a continuous-wave electric-field 
and with random configurations of wires is developed with 
a Monte-Carlo approach. The frequency dependence of the 
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mean induced power and the survivor function of the samples 
as a function of the field magnitude are obtained. Finally, a 
discussion on the obtained results and general conclusions are 
presented in section five. 
2. ELECTROMAGNETIC COUPLING 
The coupling between an incident plane wave and the 
bridge-wire of an EED can be decomposed in two transfer 
functions10,12, which correspond to the external interaction and 
the penetration. 
2.1 External Interaction: Plane Wave Excitation
In a differential mode coupling, the connection wires act 
as receiving antenna and the incident electric field induces 
currents that feed the EED. Thus, the system (i.e. EED and 
wires) can be represented by an equivalent circuit, as shown in 
Fig. 1, in which the EED is represented by a load impedance 
ZEED and the wires are represented by a Norton equivalent 
current source IN  with an internal impedance ZA. Note that the 
dipole shown in Fig. 1a is only for illustrative purposes. 
Although the Norton current source and the source 
equivalent impedance could be calculated by using analytical 
expressions for canonical cases (e.g. dipole), the parameters of 
a wire with arbitrary geometry must be obtained through a full-
wave simulation. The time domain integral equation (TDIE) 
technique with marching on time (MOT) scheme15 was chosen 
in this study. The antenna input impedance can be calculated 
exciting the structure with a voltage source located on the mid-
point of the structure, and the induced short circuit current (i.e. 
Norton current) can be determined by exciting the complete 
geometry of the wires with an incident plane wave. 
The input impedance of the EED was obtained analytically 
by means of a transmission line model9, which is based on the 
EED’s diagram presented in Fig. 1a. The EED is modeled by 
three transmission lines in cascade loaded with the bridge 
wire. The type of transmission line depends on the structure 
and materials in each transversal section. The first section at 
the EED input can be represented by a two-wire line in air, 
the second, which corresponds to the insulating header, by a 
twin-axial line in rubber, and the third, the primary explosive 
section, by another twin-axial line in lead-azide. Knowing the 
characteristic impedance in each transmission line, the input 
impedance of each section can be calculated as17
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(2 / )
kk p k
f lq = π n ∆  is the section’s electrical length. Thus, the 
load of the last section corresponds to the bridge wire, and the 
input impedance of the two-wire line section corresponds to the 
EED’s input impedance. The characteristics of the transmission 
lines used to represent a typical EED9 are summarized in 
Table 1. 
Figures 2(a) and 2(b) show, as an example, the EED’s 
input impedance as a function of the frequency compared with 
the simulated input impedance of a 21.3 cm long dipole with 
a wire diameter of 0.7 mm. The EED presents low impedance 
at low frequency because, in this range, the impedance value 
is close to the bridge-wire resistance at DC, which is about 
1.3Ω. In contrast, the wires, with impedance ZA, show high 
impedance at low frequency due to its open circuit termination. 
Most connection circuits of EEDs before its activation are 
open-ended; therefore, the response presented in Figs. 2(a) and 
Table 1. Transmission line parameters of the EED model. Adapted from the work of Lambretch9, et al.
Figure 1. (a) Diagram and (b) equivalent circuit of an incident plane wave on an EED with connection wires. Typical sections of a 
hot-wire detonator are depicted.
(a) (b)
Section Transmission Line ∆l (mm) εr
Per unit length parameters
Zo (Ω) υp /cC (pF/m) L (µH/m)
Feed wires Two-wire 7.9 1 12.13 0.918 275.10 1
Insulating Header Twin-axial in rubber 37 3 49.90 0.892 133.70 0.50
Primary Charge Twin-axial in lead-azide 3.3 17 212.07 0.892 64.85 0.24
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2(b) can be considered as typical in most practical cases. The 
figures also show the resonant behavior of both structures, with 
alternating phase and magnitude as the frequency increases. 
As a result, there are multiple frequencies in which the EED’s 
impedance is close to the conjugate complex of the wires’ 
impedance. When this condition is satisfied, the maximum 
power transfer is obtained in the circuit of Fig. 1(b). The first 
two frequencies that comply with this condition are 550 MHz 
and 900 MHz, as depicted in Figs. 2(a) and 2(b). 
      
2.2 Penetration
The actual element in the system that transforms EM 
energy into heat in the EED is the bridge-wire (see Fig.1(a)). 
Thus, the activation state depends on the dissipated power on 
this element. Neglecting the losses in the transmission lines 
that represent the EED, the power dissipated on the bridge-
wire is the same as the one delivered to the input of the EED. 
Using the Norton equivalent, the power delivered to the EED 
(Pd) can be obtained using Eqn. (2)
18.
2
21 Re{ }
2
A
d N EED
A EED
ZP I Z
Z Z
=
+                                   
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where IN is the Norton current, ZA is the wires’ impedance, and 
ZEED is the EED’s input impedance. In addition, considering the 
wires as an antenna, this power is given by18 
Pd = Wi Aer                            (3)
where Wi=|Ei|
2/(240π) is the power density of the incident 
electromagnetic wave, Ei is the incident electric field, and Aer is 
the realized effective area, which only depends on the antenna 
and load properties. Note that the impedance mismatch and 
the polarization mismatch losses are included in Aer. Thus, the 
realized effective area corresponds to the transfer function of 
the electromagnetic coupling between the incident plane wave 
and the bridge-wire power. Aer can be calculated from the power 
obtained with Eqn. (2) and the known incident electric field. 
To verify experimentally the coupling model, the absorbed 
power in a 100 Ω load connected to the wires of the previous 
example was measured in an anechoic chamber. The incident 
plane wave was generated connecting a reference antenna to 
a port of a vector network analyzer (VNA) with a wideband 
amplifier. Two reference antennas (Log Periodic Dipole Array 
LPDA and Double-Ridged Guide Antenna HORN) were used 
to cover the frequency range between 200MHz and 3GHz. The 
received power in a balanced port of the VNA was obtained 
following the procedure presented by Pantoja16, et al. The 
calculated and measured powers are presented in Fig. 2(c), 
showing a good agreement. 
When the same wires are loaded with the EED, its 
impedance dependence with the frequency changes the 
frequency response in the absorbed power. This was calculated 
with Eqn. (2) and is presented in Fig. 2(d). As expected, the 
power presents local maxima at the frequencies in which the 
EED and the wires impedances are matched. In addition, it 
is possible to see that the global maximum value is obtained 
in the first matching frequency. That is the effect of the short 
circuit current frequency response; the power follows the 
current general tendency of decreasing its magnitude with the 
frequency. 
Figure 2. Frequency response of the (a) magnitude and (b) 
phase of the input impedances of the EED and of 
the 21.3 cm long wires in dipole configuration. The 
frequency responses of the power dissipated in a load 
of (c) 100 Ω and (d) ZEED due to a 1-V/m electric field 
impinging the wires are also plotted.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
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3. THERMAL DISSIPATION 
EEDs, specifically hot-wire detonators, are activated by a 
deflagration process19. When the temperature of the bridge-wire 
exceeds the autoignition temperature of the primary charge, it 
detonates and activates the secondary explosive. This critical 
temperature for the lead azide, a material commonly used as 
primary charge, is 350 °C20. By using a 3D thermal model 
implemented in ANSYS®, the necessary power dissipated in the 
bridge-wire to achieve the critical temperature was calculated. 
The steady state model includes both natural convective 
heat transfer with the surrounding air and conductive heat 
transfer inside the EED. In order to include the natural 
convection of the air in the simulation, the structure and the 
surrounding air were implemented in ANSYS® Mechanical 
APDL application with FLUID142 type elements21 and the 
solution was obtained using a FLOTRAN analysis. The 
dimensions of the simulated EED are given in Table. 1 and the 
properties of the implemented materials in the thermal model 
are depicted in Table 2. The model was excited applying a 
constant power generation condition in the bridge-wire.
where Pd is the dissipated power and Rth is the EED’s thermal 
resistance (i.e. the inverse of the heat loss factor25), which 
corresponds to the slope value of the curve in Fig. 3. With this 
expression, the temperature due to a given power can be directly 
calculated and vice-versa. Assuming an ambient temperature 
of 20 °C and  Rth= 973.76 °C/W, the critical temperature of the 
lead azide is obtained with 0.34 W.
For illustrative purposes, the temperature dependence 
obtained from the experimental data presented by Kankane25, 
et al. for a ‘Type 1’ detonator is also plotted in Fig. 3. The 
detonator ‘Type 1’ corresponds to a low energy detonator with 
low no-fire current (<0.3 mA), such as the one simulated in this 
work. The measurements were made by feeding the detonator 
with D.C. power values below 0.05 W and by calculating the 
bridge-wire temperature increase from its resistance change. The 
curve presented in Fig. 3, with triangular markers, corresponds 
to the linear extrapolation up to 0.35 W of the measured steady 
state temperature. Both curves, from ANSYS® simulation and 
from experimental results, show similar slopes in the linear 
responses, which was expected since both are low energy 
devices. 
4. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS: WIRES WITH 
RANDOM GEOMETRIES 
4.1 Random Geometries
The variation in the geometries of the connection wires 
was performed by modifying its length and pattern. Arbitrary 
patterns were obtained by dividing the wire in sections with 
equal length but with different inclination angles. Figure 4 
shows the six variable angles in the x-y and y-z plane. 
Figure 3. Bridge-wire temperature as function of the dissipated 
power. The ANSYS® results are compared with the 
measurements on a ‘Type 1’ EED25.
Figure 4. Variable angles for the generation of arbitrary 
geometries of wires.
Table 2. Thermal Properties of the ANSYS® model
Material Density (kg/m3)
Specific heat 
(J/kg K)
Conductivity 
(W/m K)
Air AIR-SI a AIR-SI a AIR-SI a
Aluminum 2702 903 237
Rubber 1000 180022 0.6 3
Lead azide 4710 569.0223 0.176 3
PETN 1770 113824 0.17 3
a Air material in the ANSYS® FLOTRAN analysis
A power sweep was performed in the simulation to obtain 
the bridge-wire temperature as a function of the dissipated 
power. The simulated temperature increment, presented in 
Fig. 3, shows a linear dependence with the dissipated power 
with a slope of 973.76 °C/W.  Therefore, the temperature 
increase T∆  can be expressed as 
th dT R P∆ =              (4)
A sample of 500 arbitrary wire structures was simulated 
with TDIE. These configurations aim to represent typical 
connections of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and they 
were obtained by assigning a random uniformly distributed 
value to the total wire’s length and to each inclination angle. 
The variation range of each variable is presented in Table 3. 
The electric field was simulated with direction of propagation 
Xˆ  and polarization Yˆ . For each case, the short circuit induced 
current, due to the external incident field, and the wire’s input 
impedance were calculated. With these values and with the 
EED’s input impedance obtained with the transmission line 
model, the power delivered to the bridge-wire of the EED was 
calculated by using Eqn. (2). 
DEF. SCI. J., VOL. 63, NO. 4, JULY 2013
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4.2 Frequency of Optimal Coupling
An optimal frequency of coupling can be defined when 
the induced power is the maximum possible for most of the 
observations. The mean value and the confidence interval of 
one standard deviation of the induced power in the EED as 
function of the frequency are presented Fig. 5(a). It clearly 
shows an optimal frequency range between 500 MHz and 
660 MHz in which the mean value of the power increases 
considerably as compared with the rest of the frequencies.  
bridge-wire compared with an arbitrary frequency outside the 
found range. The mean value of the 600 MHz distribution is 
8.9 dB lower than the mean value of the best case, while the 
difference between the arbitrary case of 2.45 GHz and the best 
one is 29.2 dB. 
4.3 Magnitude of the Excitation
Now, it is necessary to know the intensity of the field able 
to induce enough average power to cause a detonation in the 
observations. To obtain this, the realized effective area of each 
wire configuration was calculated introducing the simulated 
power and 1V/m incident field in Eqn. (3). Then, the critical 
power obtained with ANSYS® (0.34W) was used in the same 
expression and the magnitude of the electric field necessary to 
produce the detonation was calculated. 
In Fig. 6, the empirical survivor function of the samples 
when the incident field is tuned at 600 MHz is shown. This 
figure depicts the probability of a wired EED to bear a specific 
electric field intensity without detonating. According to these 
results, the electric field intensity required to detonate 70 per 
cent of devices is 890 V/m and to detonate the 95 per cent is 
2447 V/m. 
Variable Parameter Min. value Max. value
L Total wire’s length 5 cm 25 cm
q1A, q1B Inclination angles q1A 
and q1B
20° 160°
q2A, q2B Inclination angles q2A 
and q2B
-90° 90°
fA Inclination angle fA 20° 160°
fB Inclination angle fB -20° -160°
a Wire’s radius 0.7 mm
|Ei| Incident electric field 1 V/m
Figure 6. Survivor function of the observations as function of the 
magnitude of the incident field for a fixed excitation 
frequency of 0.6 GHz. 
Table 3. Parameters of the EM Coupling Simulation
Figure 5. (a) Mean value and 68.3% confidence interval of the induced power in the bridge-wire of an EED with connection wires 
with arbitrary geometries as functions of the frequency. (b) Histograms of the induced power for two frequencies: 0.6 GHz 
and 2.45 GHz. The histogram of the maximum possible induced power is also presented for comparison. 
Although the estimated frequency range limits the 
spectrum in which a good coupling between the incident 
electric field and the bridge-wire is probable, its bandwidth 
is wide for a high-power microwave source. For this reason, 
the best single frequency must be chosen. In Fig. 5(b), the 
probability density function (PDF) of the induced power in the 
bridge-wire when the incident electric field has a frequency of 
600 MHz is presented. This is compared with the best case, 
which corresponds to having an electric field able to excite the 
frequency of maximum coupling of each observation, and with 
an excitation frequency of 2.45 GHz, which is outside the range 
of good coupling.  The figure shows that a normal distribution 
can represent each case and that the 600 MHz frequency for 
the excitation increases considerably the induced power in the 
(a) (b)
ELECTRIC FIELD (V/m)
BRIDGE-WIRE POWER Pd (dBm)
d
e
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5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
A statistical analysis of the susceptibility of EEDs to 
microwave radiation was presented. Arbitrary geometries in the 
connection wires of this device were simulated, creating a set 
of possible configurations. The frequency dependence of the 
electromagnetic responses of both the connection wires and the 
EED was included in a coupling model. Then, the transfer function 
between an incident electric field with linear polarization and the 
dissipated power in the EED’s bridge-wire was obtained for each 
sample. Analyzing the probability density of the dissipated power, 
the optimal coupling frequency of the system for a continuous 
wave (CW) excitation was calculated. In addition, this power was 
compared with the critical activation value, which was determined 
with an ANSYS® steady state thermal model, and the survivor 
function of a typical EED with connection wires as a function of 
the magnitude of the incident field was determined. 
Here, a CW excitation was considered; therefore, the 
activation was determined using a comparison between the 
average power induced due to the CW excitation and the power 
threshold obtained in ANSYS® with a steady state thermal 
model. For a transient excitation (e.g. a damped sinusoidal), 
the EED thermal response could be modeled using a first or 
second order differential equation26 and the activation should 
be determined when the bridge-wire temperature exceeds the 
critical temperature of the primary charge.    
Other factors of the coupling, such as the polarization and 
the propagation medium, evidently affect the induced power 
in the EED. The incident wave polarization has a significant 
effect on the wire’s effective area. In this study, the incident 
wave was assumed to have the same polarization as the 
average wire’s geometry. Although, due to the variability of the 
geometries, there is always a non-zero probability of inducing 
antenna currents, a considerable reduction in the mean induced 
power would be expected if an orthogonal polarization were 
considered. On the other hand, the simulations were carried 
out in free space; however, different propagation media can be 
presented in a real scenario. In the case of a buried device, for 
example, three main effects should be considered: 
(a) a reflection of the incident wave due to change of media
(b) attenuation due to the media losses, and 
(c) disturbance of the device’s near field due to the properties 
of the surrounding medium. 
As a result, the induced power in the EED would decrease 
according to the propagation losses. In addition, the frequency 
dependence of the mean induced power, as shown in Fig. 5 (a), 
would result modified caused by the effect of the surrounding 
media on the wire’s effective length. 
The separation of the problem in the scheme of external 
interaction and the penetration provides an easier way to 
bear with devices that have elements with both random and 
deterministic (typical) responses. This scheme reduces the 
complexity of the problem since only the variable part of the 
problem is simulated numerically and the other is calculated 
analytically. In the implemented model, the connection wires 
were represented by wire antennas in free space, but in many 
applications the surrounded material can have different values 
for the permittivity and losses. For this reason, a future work is 
to analyze the effect of these parameters in the optimal coupling 
frequency and in the survivor function. 
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